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S inging on the anchor : the difficulties in achie ing greenhouse gas abatement in shipping via virtual 
arrival  
 
René Taudal Poulsen and Helen Sampson 
 
Abstract 
The abatement of greenhouse gas emissions represents a major global challenge and an important topic for 
transportation research. Several studies have argued that energy efficiency measures for virtual arrival and 
associated reduced anchorage time can significantly reduce emissions from ships by allowing for speed 
reduction on passage. However, virtual arrival is uncommon in shipping. In this paper, we examine the 
causes for waiting time for ships at anchor and the limited uptake of virtual arrival. We show the difficulties 
associated with the implementation of virtual arrival and explain why shipping is unlikely to achieve the 
related abatement potential as assumed by previous studies. Combining onboard observations with 
seafarers and interviews with both sea-staff and shore-based operational personnel we show how 
ha te e s  commercial priorities outweigh the fuel saving benefits associated with virtual arrival. 
Moreover, we demonstrate how virtual arrival systems have unintended, negative consequences for 
seafarers in the form of fatigue. Our findings have implications for the IMO s greenhouse gas abatement 
goals.  
Keywords: Greenhouse gas abatement; Energy efficiency; Virtual arrival; Speed optimization; Waiting time 
Highlights 
 We study efficiency measures for greenhouse gas emission abatement in shipping 
 We explain why ships wait at anchor and why virtual arrival is uncommon 
 We show how cargo-o e s  de isio s increase emissions from shipping 
 We show that commercial priorities outweigh fuel saving benefits of virtual arrival  
 We describe how virtual arrival systems may increase seafarer fatigue 
1. Introduction 
The reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) from the international shipping industry is a major 
business/policy challenge and an important research topic (e.g., Smith et al. 2014; Bows-Larkin 2015; Lister 
et al. 2015; Petitt et al. 2018; Psaraftis 2018). In 2012, the international shipping industry accounted for 
approximately 2.1 per cent of anthropogenic GHG emissions (Smith et al. 2014), and the U ited Natio s  
International Maritime Organization (IMO) recently set two goals for significant emissions abatement. By 
2030, the industry should reduce its emissions per transport work  by 40 per cent (relative to 2008), and by 
2050 it should halve absolute emissions (compared to 2008) (IMO 2018).  
The use of both energy efficiency measures (e.g., Faber et al. 2011; Eide et al. 2011; Johnson et al. 2013; 
Rehmatulla 2014; Poulsen and Sornn-Friese 2015; Poulsen and Johnson 2016; Viktorelius and Lund 2019; 
Knorring 2019) and alternative fuels (e.g., Brynolf et al. 2014; Rojon & Dieperink 2014) have been proposed 
to abate emissions. Eide et al. (2009), Bazari and Longva (2011), Faber et al (2011), Johnson and Styhre 
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(2015), Jia et al. (2017), and Andersson and Ivehammar (2017), have all pointed to significant potential for 
e issio s  a ate e t through increased voyage efficiency (i.e. travel at the minimum speed necessary). 
Generally speaking, a ship s fuel consumption is linearly related to the third or fourth power of the speed 
(Faber et al. 2011; IMO 2016).1 Speed reductions can therefore significantly reduce fuel consumption and 
air emissions. The IMO has also emphasized this in its guidance to ship-owners (IMO 2009, 2018).  
Reduced waiting time would appear to represent a win-win for business and the environment, because 
slower voyages should result in lower costs and air emissions without adverse effects on transportation 
capacity or time (Faber et. 2011; Jia et al. 2017). Notwithstanding the automatic benefits that come with 
reduced fuel consumption at lower speeds, however, ships still a i e at po ts ea l  a d spend time 
waiting at anchor (Johnson and Styhre 2015, Jia et al. 2017). In 2009, a tanker shipping vice president 
summarized the paradox associated with waiting time at anchorage in the following way: So the ships 
hurry to the port and sit there and wait, sometimes for weeks. We hurry to wait.  Llo d s List . This 
suggests that whilst it would be feasible for ships to slow down and consume less fuel that is currently not 
what is happening.  
In recent years, charterers and shipping companies have tried to implement just-in-time arrivals with help 
of the virtual arrival system . In 2009, BP Shipping pioneered virtual arrival with Maersk Tankers on the 
tanker Bro Elizabeth (Maersk 2009; BP/Maersk 2010; BP 2011). In the voyage charter party the two parties 
included a virtual arrival clause. When it became evident that the oil terminal could not accommodate the 
tanker at the originally expected time, the clause enabled the ship to slow down and postpone arrival by 27 
hours. Under this arrangement the vessel was deemed to have arrived i tuall  at the originally agreed 
time. This allowed the ship-owner to earn demurrage from the charterer for the longer than expected use 
of the ship. A third party weather routing service verified the updated schedule and route. BP and Maersk 
estimated fuel savings in the range of 27 per cent (equivalent to 183.2 metric tons of CO2) from slowing 
down the vessel, and shared the bunker savings of USD 24,800 equally. For the ship-owner this represented 
a 6 percent improvement in earnings, and the charterer saved 3 percent on the freight bill. In their 
promotion of virtual arrival, BP and Maersk o luded: The e is o lose  ith Vi tual A i al.  BP/Mae sk 
2010, p. 10). 
The principles of virtual arrival were further explored by BIMCO, a global ship-owner association with 
extensive legal expertise in charter parties. BIMCO developed a virtual arrival clause, which ship-owners 
and charters could include in voyage charter parties (BIMCO 2013) and a slow-steaming clause for time 
charters (BIMCO 2011) to allow for speed optimization while en route. At the same time the shipping press 
embraced virtual arrival with enthusiasm (Llo d s List 2010, 2011a, 2011b). Intertanko (a global tanker-
owners  association) also advised its member to use virtual arrival (Intertanko/OCIMF 2010), and hosted a 
virtual arrival launching event in the presence of the EU Commissioner for Transport in 2011 (Intertanko 
2011). However, several years later, virtual arrival remains uncommon Llo d s List 6, 2019), and this 
begs the question – why? 
The occurrence of waiting time in an industry with intense price competition, low profit margins and strong 
cost pressures (Stopford 2009, UNCTAD 2018) is remarkable and the causes of such apparent inefficiencies 
                                                          
1 Strictly speaking, the speed-fuel consumption curve is U-shaped. Ships have high fuel consumption at very low 
speed, because they encounter high wind and wave resistance. 
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deserve more attention within transportation research. Following calls by Johnson and Styhre (2015) and 
Adland and Jia (2018), we explore the difficulties in achieving air emission abatement via virtual arrival, and 
investigate the following two related research questions: Why do ships wait at anchorage? and Why is the 
uptake of virtual arrival in shipping so limited? We focus on tankers and dry bulk ships, which represented 
71.5 per cent of the world fleet (in terms of deadweight tonnage) in 2017 and accounted for approximately 
the same share of GHG emissions from shipping in 2012 (Smith et al. 2014). They predominantly operate as 
tramps, i.e. ta i se i es  of the sea. In contrast the scheduled liner services for container ships and ferries 
ep ese t us se i es  of the sea (UNCTAD 2018). Several studies (e.g., Golias et al. 2009; Corbett et al. 
2009; Du et al. 2011; Qi and Song 2012; Lalla-Ruiz et al. 2018) have investigated the potential for speed and 
port time optimization in liner shipping. Viktorelius and Lund (2019) also did an ethnographic study on the 
potential for energy efficiency onboard five ropax vessels, which operate in ferry services. However, the 
results from liner shipping are not transferrable to tramp shipping, where the trading patterns, cargo 
operations and commercial conditions are fundamentally different.  
In this paper we: review the literature on virtual arrival, port time and speed choice in tanker and dry bulk 
shipping, and elaborate on the research gap which we address; present our methods; discuss causes for the 
limited uptake up virtual arrival and the causes waiting at anchorage and in port; and engage with the 
existing literature. Finally, we summarize our findings in the conclusion, and discuss the policy implications.  
2. Literature review 
Speed optimization has attracted considerable attention amongst academics (Cariou 2011, Mander 2017; 
Psaraftis 2019) who have identified its benefits. Slow-steaming  occurs in response to rising fuel costs and 
depressed freight rates (Chang and Wang 2014; Psaraftis 2019). Extending transit times and decreasing a 
essel s productivity, slow-steaming is feasible with simple engine load reductions. More complicated 
retrofit measures such as bulbous bow and main engine modifications have also been employed by ship-
o e s to opti ize ships fo  lo e  se i e speeds e.g., Llo ds  List . However, Adland and Jia (2018) 
showed that fuel prices and freight rates were not good predictors of the service speeds for capesize dry 
bulk carriers in the period 2011-12. Ships did not reduce speed despite high fuel costs and low freight rates, 
indicating that other constraints might affect speed choice. They attributed the counterintuitive findings to 
weather conditions and charter party clauses.  
In contrast to slow-steaming, energy efficiency measures for virtual arrival and reduced waiting time do not 
extend transportation times or reduce annual transport capacity. They just minimize time at anchorage, 
and therefore allow for lower voyage speeds. Corbett et al. (2009), Bazari and Longva (2011), Eide et al. 
2011, Faber et al. (2011), Rehmatulla and Smith (2015), and Johnson and Styhre (2015) see reduced waiting 
time in anchorage/port as a cost-effective energy efficiency measure. Eide et al. (2011) found that reduced 
waiting time was amongst the most cost-effective of all fuel saving measures and Faber et al. (2011) 
estimated a fuel saving potential of up to 10 per cent. Johnson and Styhre (2015) studied the port 
turnaround time for two dry bulk ships trading in European short-sea trades and estimated that a reduction 
in port time of one to four hours could lead to fuel savings of up to 8 percent for vessels in these trades. 
Andersson and Ivehammar (2017) analyzed waiting time at anchor for vessels in the Baltic Sea in 2015 and 
identified significant fuel saving potential, in particular for tankers. They based their analysis on high-
granular ship-position data sets from the Automated Identification System (AIS). Jia et al. (2017) also used 
AIS-data sets to analyze the waiting times for 483 Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) during the period 2013-
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15. They concluded that … fuel sa i gs a  a ge f o  .  % ith o l  a % edu tio  i  e ess  po t 
time, to 19 % if all appa e t i effi ie ies a  e e o ed  (Jia et al. 2017, p. 57), and argued …that the e 
is a substantial untapped environmental benefit from forcing the implementation of a VA [Virtual Arrival] 
policy at the global level in place of the current First-come-first-se ed po t poli ies  Jia et al. , p. . 
They proposed that the IMO and EU should consider policy measures to address this. 
Although some researchers have touched on virtual arrival and the importance of collaboration between 
stakeholders, including port authorities, in its implementation (Gibbs et al. 2014, Poulsen et al. 2018), the 
reason why virtual arrival has not been implemented more broadly has not been given close attention. 
Charter parties frequently incentivize on time arrival (Panayides 2018) but virtual arrival systems seem in 
theory to address the pressures that these would otherwise exert on ship operators in terms of arrival 
times. However, that seems not to be the case and this requires further investigation. Our study sheds light 
on the reasons why virtual arrival has not been implemented in shipping and the broader implications of 
these for policy discussions on how to achieve the IMO s GHG goals.  
3. Methods 
In our exploration of two why questions, we employed two qualitative research methods in this research. 
We conducted semi-structured interviews (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009) with shipping company managers in 
order to explore their perceptions of why virtual arrival was not being requested by clients and to discover 
whether it was ship operators themselves who were creating barriers to virtual arrival. We also undertook 
non-participant observation (Kristiansen and Krogstrup 1999) onboard two tankers for a total of 37 days in 
order to understand the perspective of seafarers and the operational considerations that might present 
barriers to the uptake of virtual arrival. 
3.1. Interviews 
We interviewed 30 top and middle managers in 18 shippi g o pa ies  chartering, operations and 
technical departments (Table 1). The chartering managers are particularly relevant for the question of 
uptake of virtual arrival. Given the experience of the Bro Elizabeth (and the high % savings achievable by 
ship operators) it would be reasonable to expect that the chartering managers employed by ship operators 
might be key in encouraging the uptake of virtual arrival agreements. They find employment for the 
o pa s vessels and negotiate contractually with charterers. In tanker shipping, charterers are mainly oil 
majors and trading houses. In dry bulk shipping, the group is more diverse, including commodity traders, 
power plants, mines and agro-businesses. The operations  a age s  e pe ie es a e highl  ele a t fo  
understanding causes for waiting time in port and at anchorage. They advise the masters about voyages, 
and provide speed instructions. They also monitor ship performance relative to charter party specifications 
and track the time used for different phases of the voyage. If delays occur, operations  managers calculate 
the economic compensation due to the affected party. Finally, the technical managers are responsible for 
technical operations and monitor each ship s fuel o su ptio . They typically have backgrounds as naval 
architects, master mariners or marine engineers. In contrast to the commercial departments of chartering 
and operations, many of the technical managers have seafaring experience of their own, which is highly 
relevant for the questions pertaining to waiting time.  
 PLEASE ADD TABLE 1 HERE 
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Table 1. Interviewees 
We carried out interviews in 2012-13 and 2018. The first period coincided with high bunker prices and 
depressed freight rates. Ship-owners had strong economic incentives to employ virtual arrival and reduce 
waiting time to lower fuel costs. Our interviews occurred shortly after BP had pioneered virtual arrival. In 
2018, bunker prices had fallen, but were exhibiting a renewed upwards trend. Tanker and dry bulk freight 
markets remained depressed due to excess capacity.  
The first period of interviews focused on the potential for fuel savings, and considered speed optimization, 
voyage execution and virtual arrival (The interview guide is reproduced in [anonymized for peer review]). 
Building on our initial findings, in 2018 we concentrated more narrowly on waiting time, voyage execution 
and virtual arrival (Appendix 1). 
In order to cover the diversity of ship types, sizes and trading patterns, interviewees were drawn from 
companies with vessels ranging from 3,000 dwt to 300,000 dwt, and engaged in both short-sea and long-
haul trades (Table 1). Ships employed in short-sea trades, call at ports frequently and spend proportionally 
more time alongside (i.e. in port or on a jetty) than ships in long-haul trades. Consequently, virtual arrival 
and reduced port time would be expected to have the highest impact on fuel consumption/GHG emissions 
in short-sea trades.  
In 2012-13 tanker and dry bulk shipping personnel were interviewed. However dry bulk interviewees 
argued that the tanker trades were more advanced with regard to use of virtual arrival (Interviewees 4,5, 8, 
12 and 16, please see Table 1) and so in 2018 we focused our attention on this sector.  
We recorded and transcribed all face to face interviews and coded them with two email interviews using 
qualitative text software (NVivo). Where interviews were conducted in Scandinavian languages we 
translated quotes into English.  
3.2. Ethnographic onboard studies 
To supplement our interviews with shore-based operational staff we drew upon ethnographic material 
collected while sailing onboard two tankers (Please see Table 2 for details on the voyages). One voyage was 
undertaken specifically in relation to this study whilst the other was conducted in conjunction with research 
on ship-shore interaction and the use of mandatory equipment and contained material which was highly 
relevant to this research. 
In relation to the voyage which was tailored to this study NN [anonymized for peer review] set out to 
identify the e s diffe e t tasks i  ship ope atio s a d voyage execution. He was particularly interested in 
the factors which affect the timing and duration of each task and he documented the different tasks, and 
activities, which took place during the different phases of the ship s voyage. In terms of the second voyage 
NN [anonymized for peer review] was particularly concerned with daily work and life on board and paid 
particular attention to interaction between seafarers and all port personnel. In the course of this voyage 
data emerged which shed strong light on some of the issues pertaining to virtual arrival. The emergence of 
such data was a feature of the grounded research design and wholly compatible with the research design. 
PLEASE ADD TABLE 2 HERE 
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Table 2. Overview of our onboard studies 
3.3. Content analysis 
We u de took a o te t a al sis of g e  lite atu e; to o te tualize, o fi , o  dis o fi , our interview 
data and observations. All articles in the global shipping newspaper Lloyd’s List, published after 1990, which 
o tai ed the o ds i tual a i al  o  o ta go  hi h is the deliberate use of tankers for floating 
storage in anticipation of oil price increases) were analyzed to consider the extent to which they supported 
or confounded our findings.  
4. Analysis 
4.1. Port and terminal logistical challenges  
Timely arrival in port is critical to the maximization of ship-operator earnings according to our interviewees. 
A head of chartering in a tanker shipping company explained the incentives for punctual arrival:  
…if ou  la da s, o  ou  ti e i do  [for arrival to the port] is between July 1st and 3rd, it is in 
ou  o  i te est to a i e as ea l  as possi le. Not Ju e  … that s ot i  ou  i te est, ut 
not on July 5th either. In that case, they [the charterer] will kick us out. So we have to arrive 
ithi  the i do . … If e a i e o  Jul  st and tender notice of readiness at 00.01, then 
our time counting is most effective... (Interviewee 21). 
Upon arrival, the captain tenders a notice of readiness to the charterer to indicate that the ship is ready for 
loading or discharging. The interviewees confirm that the notice of readiness is an important legal 
document, which signals contractual compliance and impacts on earnings.  
Our onboard observations also confirmed that the timing of tendering of the notice of readiness was 
important to the master, one of whom explained to us that he will tender it to the shipping company, the 
broker, the terminal, the charterer and the agent. On the bridge the ECDIS-system constantly displayed the 
Expected Time of Arrival to port (ETA), and the master explained: 
The arrival time has implications for voyage revenue, and the shipping company does not 
want the ship to arrive too early… The la -can, which is the agreed time period for the 
tendering of notice of readiness in accordance with the charter party, is important to 
observe. If the vessel arrives late, the shipping company will be in trouble. If the vessel 
arrives early at the jetty, the charterer will have to pay extra port charges. For the master it 
important to arrive on time as advised by the shipping company operations  manager 
(Fieldnotes from Northern Hemisphere).  
Thus it would appear that ship operators actively seek to arrive in port and to wait. When asked, if waiting 
time occurs, a vice president of tanker operations replied:  
A lot. I would say. But it is also very seasonal and in different ports. … We can probably look 
at the exact statistics but in around 75% of the voyages we perform there is demur age…[…] 
And then half of those is almost always at anchorage that waiting time occurs. So we 
probably wait, eah, % of the ases … or 70% (Interviewee 29). 
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However, deliberate orchestration of arrival time is not the only reason why ships wait at anchor and 
congestion may produce additional delays. Interviewees explained that waiting time varies between ports. 
In 2012-13 dry bulk interviewees singled out Brazilian and Australian ports as major points of congestion 
and long waiting times (Interviewees 4, 6, and 11). Interviewees mentioned examples of 30-80 day waits 
(Interviewees 4, 6, and 11). Such delays are in line with the operational interests of vessel operators and in 
2013, a dry bulk ship-owner explained that: 
The ship-o e  does t a e, e ause he gets paid. He e ei es aiti g o e  [de u age]. 
…. Do  i  “outh A e i a, u e t aiti g times are 70-80 days. We are very happy about 
that (Interviewee 6). 
At anchor, the crew turn off the main engines, and auxiliary engines provide power for hotel functions, 
cargo-heating etc. If the weather does not permit anchoring, the vessel will drift slowly in a safe area, which 
both authors experienced in the course of their voyages. This is the less preferable option and a head of 
chartering explained that:  
We will do whatever we can to anchor. The  e do t eed to d ift. When drifting, we will 
use an additional 3 to 4 tons of bunkers per day to keep the ship running (Interviewee 24). 
Both chartering and operations managers saw waiting times as attractive for two reasons. Waiting 
withdraws capacity from the freight market (Interviewees 4, and 6) and at the same time ship-owners earn 
demurrage. Demurrage is important revenue for ship-owners, particularly with depressed freight markets. 
In an interview in 2018, a senior operations manager explained that the shipping company earnt its profit 
while waiting at anchor. In April 2018, the daily time charter equivalent (TCE) for a handy size tanker was 
around USD 12,000, but demurrage was USD 18,000 per day (Interviewee 19). The head of operations 
acknowledged that their ships, operating in the spot market, consumed extra fuel while sailing, but 
demurrage outweighed the extra fuel costs.  
All our interviewees attributed some port waiting time to terminal logistical challenges. Sometimes berths 
were occupied by previously delayed vessels. In other cases refineries did not have available cargo. In cases 
of discharging, lack of tank storage capacity also caused delayed berthing. Interviewees explained that such 
situations are entirely beyond their control but that they were not unhappy with them. As a vice president 
of tanker chartering explained: 
[…] We a ot i flue e the ope atio … I  fa t, it is an advantage to us, if they [the 
charterer and oil terminal] make mistakes, so that the whole process will take longer 
(Interviewee 21). 
4.2. Cargo values and fuel savings 
In this context, it is understandable that ship operators may not be highly incentivized to push for virtual 
arrival clauses in their charter parties nevertheless they argued that they were ready to offer it to their 
charterers, but it was not requested (Interviewees 2, 3, 11, 16, and 18). The head of sustainability in a 
shipping company explained:  
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All documents and everything are ready [for virtual arrival]. Many customers decline the 
offer, however. Unfortunately. So it is not the great success we had dreamt of (Interviewee 
16).  
An operator of dry bulk vessels referred to cargo-owner preferences for fast delivery and port first-come-
first-serve policies. He said:  
But with regard to virtual arrival. We have discussed it with several of the large costumers. 
They just reply: Forget it. It makes no sense. They see no reason to use it. The only thing that 
matters for them is to get the ship to port, which then decides when the ship can dock 
(Interviewee 5). 
In 2018, little had changed in this regard. Virtual arrival was not widely adopted (Interviewees 21, and 24). 
The absence of virtual arrival was also evidenced by articles in Lloyd’s List, which had published only one 
a ti le ith a e tio  of i tual a i al  si e “epte e   o  Ja ua  , . In 2019, Lloyd’s List 
quoted an IMO representative for the following:  
“hips spe d a lot of ti e aiti g to e te  po ts… O  a e age, a ship ight spend 5%-10% of 
a o age aiti g at a  a ho age Llo ds  List .  
Several interviewees argued that charterers were driven by commercial priorities relating to markets for 
valuable cargo (Interviewees 4, 16, 17, and 24). Cargo values significantly outweigh freight bills and fuel 
costs. Oil prices are highly volatile, and this volatility provides the basis for trading and speculation for 
o odit  t ade s o  the o ld s o odit  e ha ges. Ca goes a e t aded hile o oa d a d a  
change owners several times during transit. Moreover, the discharging port can change several times 
during a voyage. Both a head of chartering (Interviewee 24) and a senior officer, with whom we talked to 
onboard, attested to this. Our fieldnotes from our conversation with the senior officer stated the following:  
Over lunch, we discussed the destination port for the vessel. The senior officer explained 
that the destination is not always known [even after departure], and recalled a voyage from 
Algeciras [at the Gibraltar Straits] into the Atlantic Basin. The crew did not know where the 
ship was going. Six different ports – from New York in the north to Houston in the south – 
were on the table, while the ship was en route. He explained that the essel stee ed a 
iddle ou se , u til the e  e ei ed i st u tio s a out which port, the cargo had been 
sold to. … The oil p i e a d the diffe e es i  oil p i es et ee  po ts dete i e the 
destination of the ship (Fieldnotes from Northern Hemisphere). 
Even though such navigation means higher fuel consumption, charterers exhibit commercially rational 
behavior. To them the value of the cargo is a more important variable than fuel cost.  
To explore the explanation with another data set, we have investigated the Bro Elizabeth virtual arrival 
case, described in Section 1. As disclosed by BP and Maersk, virtual arrival enabled BP to reduce the freight 
bill by USD 12,400 from 539,400 to 527,000 due to fuel savings (Table 4). If – for the sake of illustration – 
we assume that the tanker was fully loaded with 37,000 tonnes of crude oil and that the price per barrel 
increased from USD 50 to 52 during the voyage (by four per cent), the cargo value would have appreciated 
by over USD 0.54 million from USD 13.60 million to USD 14.15 million (Table 5). This is a conservative 
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estimate of oil price changes. In 2009, crude oil prices fluctuated between 35 and 80 USD per barrel. Even a 
small percentage increase in cargo value would indeed significantly offset fuel savings from virtual arrival.  
This explanation is also supported by evidence in the shipping press. In market reports in Lloyd’s List, there 
are numerous mentions of fully loaded tankers, which have anchored for days, weeks or even months, 
while waiting for berthing instructions from charterers. If the charterer expects oil prices to rise, he or she 
may be willing to wait and pay demurrage. The situation when numerous tankers are used for floating 
sto age, as o odit  t ade s spe ulate a d ait fo  isi g oil p i es, is alled o ta go Llo d s List 
2015a, 2015b). Waiting time at anchorage is a commercially rational decision for the charterer, given the 
demurrage rate and the cargo value. The potential gains from an appreciation in cargo value will outweigh 
the potential benefits associated with virtual arrival.  
These were not the only disincentives to charterers with regard to virtual arrival agreements. There were 
also financial risks attached to potential delays resulting from unforeseen events making charterers 
reluctant to cut things too fine in relation to timing. A ship operator explained that: 
That it is a risk of not having the ship in port as well. Because if refining has to close down or 
whatever, that would cost so much more than that what you can potentially save by having a 
ship arrive one day later. We also have gas ta ke s … and there we see they [charterers] 
want the ships to be in port even though they are there 3 or 4 days early. The  the ll athe  
see the ship steaming full ahead, just to be there in port and then steaming around for 3 or 4 
days, until they will go in just to make sure (Interviewee 29). 
The explanations we received from the shipping company interviewees during the two interview rounds 
were very similar. According to the ship-owner interviewees, the charterers are more concerned about 
certainty for delivery of a highly valuable cargo than any possible fuel savings from virtual arrival. Several 
interviewees explained that the costs of an oil terminal or refinery closure due to a vessel, which has only 
arrived virtually, but not physically, greatly exceed the benefits of bunker savings (Interviewees 3, 10, 16, 
and 18). A fuel efficiency manager in a tanker shipping company technical organization stated:  
They [the refineries] like to have ships waiting, because it is a really bad thing not to have 
any oil to process. You don't want to stop a refinery, so it needs to keep moving, so if there is 
a delay, it is nice to have somebody standby, who can come in… Interviewee 18).  
4.3. Lack of trust 
Some of our shipping interviewees – both in 2012-13 and 2018 – added one further explanation to the 
absence of virtual arrival in shipping: lack of trust between the shipping companies and the ports. They 
argued that in many ports a ship ould u  the isk of losi g its ti ket i  the aiti g li e fo  e th , if the  
only arrived virtually (Interviewees 5 and 16). A gas tanker shipping company CEO emphasized lack of trust, 
when explaining why cargo-owners rejected offers to include a virtual arrival clause in charter parties. 
Virtual arrival clauses? We also ha e that. It s ot idel  a epted i  the gas ta ke  i dust . 
Yes, ut, eh, the theo  is good. P a ti e is diffi ult. … It s e ause of t ust. I do t thi k a  
te i als ha e t ust. … I  so e pa ts of the o ld, t ust o es i  e  sho t suppl . If you 
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call them and say: I should have arrived 1700 hrs, but I will only arrive at 2300 hrs, they will 
just say, okay, then your arrival time is 2300 hrs. (Interviewee 27). 
Finally, some interviewees also added that the validation of fuel savings from virtual arrival remains a 
difficult issue. Despite the use of a third party weather service provider, they found difficulties in verifying 
the fuel savings achieved vis-à-vis charterers (Interviewees 1, 5, 18 and 24). These factors may also prevent 
the implementation of virtual arrival. 
4.4. Unintended consequences of virtual arrival  
In our conversations with seafarers onboard, they explained how vessel trading patterns affect their stress 
levels. A bridge officer:  
… as eall  ti ed of the f e ue t po t alls, hi h a e e  st essful. He as hopi g fo  a lo g 
voyage soon, for instance a voyage of 17 days duration to Nigeria (Quoted from fieldnotes, 
Northern Hemisphere) 
Another senior officer explained that:  
…he had had to work until 2 am with administrative tasks. There is simply so much 
ad i ist ati e o k to do efo e a po t all… This is pa ti ula l  st essful i  o e tio  ith 
frequent port calls and short voyages.  
He explained that administrative procedures differed from port to port, adding further burdens. He would 
recommend to the shipping company only to send young senior officers onboard ships in the short-sea 
trades. Stress levels were very high due to very high administrative burdens and frequent disruptions of 
sleep (Fieldnotes from Northern Hemisphere). 
Seafarers unanimously described how short-sea trades are stressful as a result of very frequent port calls, 
and this is consistent with our own observations. In short sea trades, many voyages take place in fairways 
with dense traffic and pilots are often onboard, adding to demands on seafarers. Sleep patterns are also 
subject to considerable disruption as port calls and associated pilot/tug operations, visits from officials and 
inspectors, may take place at any time day/night. As a result in short-sea trades many seafarers see time at 
anchorage as a welcome opportunity to catch up on work and/or rest. As an officer at anchor explained: 
This is si pl  the est ti e fo  e  (Quoted from our fieldnotes, Northern Hemisphere).  
A technical superintendent with seafaring experience explained the main differences between the working 
environment and working pace onboard vessels employed in the long-haul and short-haul trades as follows:  
The major difference is stress. Many people simply cannot cope, working on small ships 
[employed in short trades]. They need ships in long-haul trades. Where they have much 
o e ti e fo  diffe e t thi gs.[…] O  the s all ships, o  the sho t hauls, […] You a e al a s 
behind with your work. There are always things to do. And then you have all the stuff that 
a  sudde l  appea . I  a atte  of i utes. A d that auses st ess. That ou do t o t ol 
your own day (Interviewee 25). 
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Other shipping company interviewees with small vessels employed in short-haul trades supported this 
account (Interviewees 28, and 30).  
In this context it is important to bear in mind that reduced waiting time may have unintended negative 
consequences in adding to seafarer fatigue. This is an important factor to take into consideration, when 
assessing the energy efficiency potential in voyage execution.  
5. Discussion  
20th century maritime history provides several examples of successful efficiency measures in the shipping 
industry. Most notably, the container revolution and improved cargo-handling methods enabled liner ships 
to radically reduce time in port in the 1960s and 1970s thereby increasing revenue earning potential 
(Poulsen et al. 2007). Today the quest for efficiency in the intensely competitive shipping industry 
continues. Several recent studies (Johnson and Styhre 2015; Jia et al. 2017; Andersson and Ivehammar 
2017) and prominent ship-owner associations (BIMCO and Intertanko) have pointed to the potential for 
reduced waiting times for tankers and dry bulk ships at berth/anchorage. Relying on satellite data, Jia et al. 
(2017) and Andersson and Ivehammar (2017) showed that waiting at anchor is common, in particular for 
tankers.  
Notwithstanding the inherent incentives for the reduction of waiting time our study confirms the 
widespread occurrence of waiting time at anchor and the very limited uptake of virtual arrival. However it 
goes beyond this, developing more nuanced explanations for rapid transit and associated waiting time than 
have been available hitherto. We show that cargo-owners have commercial imperatives other than fuel 
savings. Waiting time at anchor is not the result of irrational behavior in shipping. On the contrary, waiting 
time occurs because of the commercial imperatives of cargo-owners, for whom access to highly valuable 
cargoes is more important than fuel savings. Our findings are consistent with the study on cargo-owner 
greening of shipping by Poulsen et al. (2016). It demonstrated that tanker shipping cargo-owners are not 
especially concerned with air emission abatement in shipping, but restrict their attention towards oil spill 
prevention.  
Jia et al. (2017) have proposed that the IMO and EU should consider policy measures aimed at compelling 
operators to implement virtual arrival in shipping. Our findings suggest, however, that the commercial 
benefits (for cargo-owners) of quick access to cargo considerably outweigh the benefits of fuel savings by 
several orders of magnitude. In this context, it is unlikely that policy measures, such as a global tax on 
bunkers or an emission trading scheme, would be sufficient to eliminate such practices. 
We have identified the fact that whilst many of the factors militating against the uptake of virtual arrival 
are beyond the control of shipping companies they nevertheless benefit from rapid transit to ports 
followed by prolonged waits. Given these dynamics our study suggests that shipping is unlikely to realize 
the potential for GHG abatement via virtual arrival as suggested by Jia. et al. (2017), Andersson and 
Ivehammer (2017) and Johnson and Styhre (2015).  
In 1998, Shove et al. argued that studies on energy efficiency often identify a technical potential for energy 
efficiency, but fail to understand the social practices that make its achievement difficult or impossible. The 
studies by Jia et al. (2017), Andersson and Ivehammer (2017) and Johnson and Styhre (2015) identified a 
significant potential for energy efficiency through virtual arrival, but our study provides a more  nuanced 
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understanding of this potential leadi g us to o lude that as a esult of  ha te e s  o e ial p io ities, 
shipping is unlikely to achieve this potential.  
Importantly, our study also highlights the risks of unintended negative consequences associated with 
virtual arrival. The risks of seafarer fatigue, in particular, are important to consider. Pauksztat (2017) has 
shown that seafarer fatigue is associated with particular trading patterns and schedules, concluding that 
…Highe  u e  of po t calls (and to some extent lower numbers of days at sea) also increase fatigue 
le els.  Pauksztat , p. . These conclusions are consistent with our analysis. 
Finally, we make a methodological contribution to transportation research on climate change mitigation, 
which has tended to adopt quantitative and positivist approaches (Schwanen et al. 2011).  We show how a 
combination of qualitative methods – semi-structured interviews and non-participant observation – can 
advance our knowledge of phenomena (such as the apparent inefficiencies of waiting time in a highly 
competitive industry), which have puzzled the predominantly quantitative transportation research for long. 
In this regard, our work aligns with the recent call by Schwanen et al. (2011) for methodological plurality 
within transportation research. Our study also resonates well with the ethnographic methods recently 
employed by Viktorelius and Lund (2019) in their onboard study on energy efficiency in ferry shipping.  
6. Conclusion 
A reduction of waiting time for ships in port/at anchor has been proposed both by researchers, and 
prominent ship-owner associations, as a means of realizing the IMO s goals fo  the abatement of 
greenhouse gas emissions. In theory the implementation of virtual arrival could allow ships to slow down 
en route and save fuel/reduce air emissions without reducing capacity or extending transportation time 
overall – to the benefit of both businesses and environment. In practice however charterers  commercial 
considerations outweigh the benefits from virtual arrival. Most cargoes exhibit significant price volatility 
and their values exceed the costs of freight and bunkers by many orders of magnitude. Virtual arrival does 
not appeal to most charterers, who are more focused on ensuring immediate access to highly valuable 
cargoes. From the point of view of the charterers (oil majors or commodity traders), it may be perfectly 
rational for a fully loaded ship to sit idle at anchorage, even though this increases fuel costs and requires 
demurrage payments to ship-owners. By being in the right spot at the right time charterers enhance their 
chances of selling the cargo at an attractive price. By the same token it is also advantageous for ship 
companies to have their vessels wait at anchor earning demurrage. This allows them to increase profit 
margins, catch up on maintenance, and allow seafarers to catch up on much-needed rest.  
In developing transportation research on air emission abatement and energy efficiency further it would be 
beneficial to explore the alternatives to virtual arrival with different types of charterers, such as oil majors, 
commodity traders, mines and agro-businesses. Future studies could investigate under which 
circumstances different types of charterers – both in tanker and dry bulk shipping – might be willing to 
include/exercise virtual arrival in charter parties or what alternatives might be considered instead. It would 
also be relevant to explore the lack of trust among stakeholders in ship operations, and the question of 
how to improve trust to abate air emissions. 
Ou  fi di gs ha e i pli atio s fo  the a hie e e t of the IMO s GHG goals. Unfortunately, despite their 
early promises virtual arrival agreements appear unlikely to make a significant contribution to the 
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achievement of these goals. Shipping is unlikely to achieve the potential for GHG abatement via these 
particular energy efficiency measures that several studies have previously identified as so promising. Our 
study shows how cargo-o e s  o e ial p io ities a d de isio s ha e a sig ifi a t effe t o  ai  
emissions from shipping, and indicates that the IMO should consider involving them more directly in their 
efforts to abate emissions from shipping. Our research suggests that policy makers urgently need to 
broaden their focus and consider a greater range of measures to ensure that they meet the required 
emissions reductions agreed at IMO. 
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Table 1. Interviewees 
Inter-
viewee  
no. 
Inter-
view 
no. Position Shipping segment(s) Date 
Duration of 
interview 
1 1 
Senior manager, Technical 
department Product tankers August 21, 2012 01:05:22 
2 2 CEO Product tankers August 24, 2012 01:17:59 
18 
 
3 2 
Senior manager, Technical 
department Product tankers August 24, 2012 
01:17:59 
4 3 Managing Director Dry bulk Nov. 29, 2012 01:37:57 
5 4 
Senior Manager, Chartering 
department Dry bulk April 17, 2013 
01:18:16 
6 5 Managing Director Dry bulk May 7, 2013 01:16:30 
7 6 
General Manager, 
Chartering department Dry bulk May 8, 2013 02:20:40 
8 6 
Senior Vice President, 
Operations department Dry bulk May 8, 2013 02:20:40 
9 6 Chief Technical Officer Gas May 8, 2013 02:20:40 
10 7 Executive Vice President Product tankers May 3, 2013 01:13:53 
11 8 
Senior Vice President, 
Operations department Dry bulk May 6, 2013 
01:40:19 
12 9 
Head of technical 
department Dry bulk May 6, 2013 01:29:23 
13 10 Director, Chartering Product tankers May 16, 2013 01:46:37 
14 10 
Director, Technical 
department Product tankers May 16, 2013 01:46:37 
15 10 Executive Vice President Product tankers May 16, 2013 01:46:37 
16 11 Director, CSR Tankers and dry bulk  June 19, 2013 01:41:21 
17 11 
Director, Technical 
department Tankers and dry bulk  June 19, 2013 01:41:21 
18 12 
Fuel Optimization Manager, 
Technical Organization 
Product, crude oil and 
gas tankers June 27, 2013 01:33:19 
19 13 
Senior manager, Operations 
department Product tankers April 17, 2018 
Telephone 
interview, not 
transcribed 
20 14 
Executive vice president, 
Technical department Product tankers March 24, 2018 
E-mail 
correspondence 
21 13 
Vice president, chartering 
department Chemicals June 26, 2018 01:18:59 
22 13 
Vice president, technical 
department Chemicals June 26, 2018 01:18:59 
23 14 
Head of Projects, technical 
department LPG July 4, 2018 01:23:14 
24 15 Head of chartering  Product July 10, 2018 01:02:49 
25 15 
Vice president, technical 
department Product July 10, 2018 01:02:49 
26 16 Technical superintendent Chemicals and product July 18, 2018 00:55:24 
27 17 CEO Gas July 24, 2018 00:53:41 
28 18 Chief Operating Manager Chemicals August 20, 2018 01:09:40 
29 19 
Vice President, Operations 
department 
LNG, chemicals and 
product August 21, 2018 00:52:56 
30 20 
General Manager, 
Chartering department Chemicals and product August 29, 2018 00:53:09 
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Table 2. Overview of our onboard studies 
Ship type 
Number of 
port calls 
Number of 
voyages Itinerary 
Number of 
days onboard Time Researcher 
Handy size 
product tanker 3 
Two ballast 
voyages and one 
laden voyage 
Gdánsk-Ventspils-
Bremen-Kiel 
Holtenau 14 
April 
2018 Poulsen 
Panamax 
product tanker  3 
Two loaded 
voyages and one 
ballast 
Colon-Panama City- 
Colombia (SBM)-
New Orleans  23 
Sept-
Oct 
2013 Sampson  
 
Interview-guide for chartering, operations and technical managers in tanker shipping companies 
June-August 2018 
 
In our e-mail approach to the interviewees, we explained our interest in the potential for reduction of GHG 
emissions from shipping. We explained that our research concerned the question of how shipping can 
achieve the GHG goals agreed at the IMO MEPC meeting in April 2018. We revealed the following two 
questions below (but not more than that): 
1. What is the potential for time savings in tanker operations (in port and at anchorage)? Could 
reduce turn-around time in port and reduced time at anchorage enable ships to slow-steam further 
and achieve emission abatement? 
2. What is your view on the GHG data collection systems from the EU (MRV) and the IMO (DCS)? 
The second part of the interview guide contained questions pertaining to the new data collection systems 
on GHG (MRV and DCS). Those questions pertain to a second study, which will be published in a separate 
paper. 
___________ 
The interviews were semi-structured. We targeted heads of chartering, operations and technical 
departments in tanker shipping companies (crude oil, product, chemical, LPG, and LNG). The interviews will 
fall in two parts:  
1. Time savings potential, because this question is focused o  the shippi g o pa ies  o  
operations.  
2. The M‘V a d DC“ dis ussio s, e ause the  a e oth o e ed ith shippi g o pa ies  o  
operations and environmental regulation. We expected the latter aspect to be more controversial 
in the view of the interviewees than the discussion on time savings. 
The overall structure of the interviews was the following: 
1. Start with open-ended questions: Please describe what you do. How you do it? How does 
regulation affect your company? 
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2. Gradually follow up with more testing questions: Did you consider the following aspects and 
factors? If you see an improvement potential, why has this potential not already been achieved? 
How can shipping achieve significant GHG emission reductions? 
3. Ending with clarifying questions about the business model of the shipping company: What are your 
competitiveness factors? (In order to supplement the information which is available in company 
annual reports and on corporate website). 
___________ 
PART 1 – POTENTIAL FOR TIME SAVINGS 
Do you see a potential for time savings in the operation of tankers, which could allow for service speed 
reductions? 
 If yes, where? 
o How large is the potential? 
o How to achieve it? 
o Why has it not been achieved already? 
 If not, why not? 
Port turn-around time 
 What are the fa to s, hi h i flue e a ship s tu -around-time in port? 
o Do you see variation in the duration of port calls? 
 If yes, what in your experience is the shortest and what is the longest? 
 What causes such variation? 
 What are the main activities during a ta ke s po t all? 
o Could you please describe the different activities and processes that take place during a 
ta ke s po t all?  
 How long time does each activity take? 
 Which of these activities is the crew or the shipping company in control of? 
 How do bunkering, provisioning, garbage and sludge handling, crew 
changes or other activities influence the time spent in port? 
o Would it be possible to save time on any of the activities?  
 Which and how? 
 How can achieve such time saving measures? 
 How do customs clearance, immigration, signing of bills of lading etc. 
influence the time spent in port? 
 Port turn-around time saving measures 
o What can you, in the chartering (or operations) department of a tanker shipping company 
do to reduce port turn-around time? 
 Do you have experiences with this? 
o What can seafarers onboard the ships do to reduce time in port? 
o Who are the other key stakeholders, who can ensure short turn-around time in port? 
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Time spent at anchorage 
 Do any of your ships spend time in laden condition at anchorages, while waiting for berth? 
o If yes: 
 Where? 
 Is there any difference in the waiting time between different geographies, 
terminals or ports?  
o If yes, what causes this variation?  
 For how long do the ships wait? 
 Is aiti g ti e at a ho age affe ted  the ship s ha te  pa t ? Or type of charter 
(voyage vs. time charter)? 
 Does waiting time at anchorage affect your earnings in any way? 
 Under voyage charters? 
o When will you start earning demurrage? 
o Does demurrage rate differ from the voyage charter rate?  
 If yes, how and why? 
 Under time charters? 
 Can you minimize or avoid the waiting time? 
 Would you want to do that? 
 What would be required to minimize waiting time? 
 Virtual arrival schemes 
o Do you use virtual arrival schemes in your company today? 
 If yes, where and when? 
 Do you propose to charterers to use virtual arrival clauses to your voyage 
charterers? 
 If not, why not? 
 Do you have experiences with virtual arrival schemes from the previous 
shipping companies that you worked in? 
 Would implementation of virtual arrival clauses not enable shipping to 
reduce its fuel consumption and achieve emission abatement? 
o Are you familiar with the BIMCO virtual arrival clause for voyage charters, which was 
developed in 2012? 
 What is your view on the clause? 
 Do you use it? Or offer your charterers to use? 
 If yes, who use it? 
o And how frequently is it used? 
 If not, why not? 
o Do you see a potential for implementation of virtual arrival schemes? 
 If yes, what would it require? 
 And who should be involved for it to succeed? 
___________ 
PART 2 – DATA SETS ON GHG EMISSIONS 
22 
 
Shipping company performance monitoring system 
- How do you measure the fuel consumption of your ships? 
o Which onboard energy consumers do you focus on? 
o Do you use noon reports? 
o Do you use auto-logging systems? 
o Do you have flow meters onboard? 
o How frequently do you collect data? 
o What do you use the data from the systems for? 
o Have you changed your systems in recent years? 
o What a e the ke  fa to s, hi h i flue e a ship s fuel o su ption? 
 Which of these factors do you have an influence on? 
View on EU MRV 
- How does the EU MRV affect the work you do and your shipping company? 
- How do you collect data for MRV? 
o Which data do you collect? 
o Where do you collect the data from? 
o Who collects the data? 
- Resources for MRV data collection 
o Who is responsible for MRV data collection in your company? 
o Did you allocate additional resources to the data collection process, in terms of: 
 Human resources, 
 New IT-infrastructure, or  
 Monitoring equipment onboard the ships in your fleet? 
o How much does the MRV data collection require of your company in terms of man-hours 
per year/human resources? 
 To comply with EU MRV did you need to make any changes in the collection of fuel 
consumption data from your fleet (i.e., amend or revise your vessel performance 
monitoring systems)? 
 If yes, which, how and why? 
- Did you use consultants or other external experts for the design or implementation of your MRV 
data collection system? 
o How do you quality control your MRV data? 
 Who is verifying your MRV data? 
 How does verification take place? 
 How frequently does it take place? 
 Can you use the process of data verification to improve your data quality? 
- Ho  does o pa s fleet pe fo a e o ito i g s ste  o pa e ith the data olle tion for 
the MRV and DCS systems? 
View on IMO DCS 
- How do you collect data for the IMO DCS? 
23 
 
o Which data do you collect? 
o Where do you collect the data from? 
o Who collects the data? 
o How frequently do you collect data? 
- Could you please compare the IMO DCS and the EU MRV? 
o What are the key differences between the two systems? 
 Do these differences affect your work or data collection in any way? 
o Do you see any differences between the systems in terms of data quality? 
 If yes, where and why? 
Internal use of MRV and DCS data 
- How do you use MRV and DCS data within your shipping company?  
o For what purposes? Why? 
o Can you use the MRV data to identify a potential for energy efficiency or other types of 
improvement potentials within your fleet? 
o Can you use the MRV or DCS data to identify fuel inefficient ships in your fleet? 
 Have you actually done so? 
- To what extent can you and your colleagues in the shipping company affect the efficiency 
measurements in the MRV and DCS systems? 
o Can you make changes in the operations of your ships, which would improve the 
performance measurements of your ships in the MRV and DCS systems? 
 If yes, how? 
 If no, why not? 
- Do the MRV or DCS data convey the same message with regard to the efficiency of individual ships? 
o If not, what are the causes for the observed differences?  
 Do the MRV and DCS systems reflect the true performance differences between 
individual ships?  
 Do the MRV and DCS data sets align with the performance metrics that you use in 
your internal fleet performance monitoring system? 
 If yes, what are the key performance metrics? 
 If not, why not? 
External use of MRV and DCS data 
- Who do you expect to use the MRV and DCS data, when data sets become publicly available? 
o Will charterers use them for chartering decisions? 
 Can they identify the most fuel efficient ships in the market? 
o Will you or your company use the data sets, when chartering ships? 
 Can you use the MRV or DCS data sets for guiding your own chartering decision? 
o Could other stakeholders have an interest in using the MRV data? 
 Who? Why? 
 For instance: 
 Port authorities (for green port fee reductions)? 
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 Policy makers? 
o For implementation of Market-Based Measures in the future? 
o What is your view on MBMs? 
 Journalists? 
 NGOs? 
 Others? 
- Does the MRV or DCS systems provide you with any business opportunities? 
- Does the MRV or DCS force you to reveal commercially sensitive information?  
o If yes, which information? 
o And what effects do you foresee from MRV and DCS? 
Link between MRV, DCS and private eco-rating schemes 
- Are you familiar with private eco-ratings in shipping? 
o If not: CCWG, CSI, ESI, Rightship, BetterFleet, EVDI 
o If yes, which ones? 
 Do you use them?  
 If yes, what for? 
 Do you know of other using it? 
o How do the eco-ratings affect the work you do, your company and the business of tanker 
shipping more broadly? 
- From you point of view, how do the MRV, DCS and the private eco-rating schemes (CCWG, ESI, CSI, 
Green Award, Rightship/EVDI and BetterFleet) compare? 
o Are they measuring the same factors?  
o Or are there important differences between any of the ratings? 
 If yes, which?  
o Are there any overlaps between the private eco-ratings and the MRV and DCS systems? 
 If yes, which? 
 I  ou  opi io , hi h of the s ste s p o ide the est easu e e t of a ship s 
energy efficiency?  
 And of its overall environmental performance? 
- Do cargo-owners ask you questions regarding your CO2 emissions or any other aspects of your 
environmental footprint? 
o If no, why not? 
o If yes, what do they ask? 
 And who asks? 
 What do they use the information for? 
View on the air emission regulation in shipping 
- What is your view on regulation of air emissions in shipping? 
o Regulation from the IMO? The EU? And others? 
o How is regulation affecting your business and your company? 
 What regulation is affecting you the most? 
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 How is regulation on air pollutants and regulation on GHG affecting your company? 
And the shipping markets? 
 What are the costs associated with compliance for you? 
o In your opinion, how can shipping achieve the GHG emissions reductions agreed at the 
April 2018 MEPC by 2050 (i.e. a 50 per cent reduction in absolute GHG emission levels 
relative to 2008)? 
 To what extent can these ambitions be achieved through efficiency improvements 
in the shipping sector? 
 In your opinion, does shipping need a new type of fuel to achieve the goals? 
- From you point of view, why did the MRV and DCS systems come into existence? 
Shipping company strategy 
- In addition to the information available on your web-page and in your annual report, so short 
follow up or clarifying questions about : 
- Which trades are you active in? 
o In terms of geography? 
o In terms of vessel sizes? 
o In terms of contract types and contract durations?  
 Use of spot, time charter, bareboat charters and Contracts of Affreightments? 
o Do you engage in asset play? 
o Do you contract newbuildings or buy second-hand vessels? 
- How are ships managed? In-house or outsourced set-up for: 
o Chartering 
o Operations 
o Technical management 
o Crewing 
o Why? What is the motivation behind this set-up? 
- What are the key sources of competitiveness for your company? 
 
 
 
